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Kenneth R. Hammond’s contributions to the study of judgment and
decision making
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Abstract
Kenneth R. Hammond (1917–2015) made several major contributions to the science of human judgment and decision
making. As a student of Egon Brunswik, he kept Brunswik’s legacy alive – advancing his theory of probabilistic functionalism
and championing his method of representative design. Hammond pioneered the use of Brunswik’s lens model as a framework
for studying how individuals use information from the task environment to make clinical judgments, which was the precursor
to much ‘policy capturing’ and ‘judgment analysis’ research. Hammond introduced the lens model equation to the study of
judgment processes, and used this to measure the utility of diﬀerent forms of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning.
He extended the scope of analysis to contexts in which individuals interact with one another – introducing the interpersonal
learning and interpersonal conﬂict paradigms. Hammond developed social judgment theory which provided a comprehensive
quantitative approach for describing and improving judgment processes. He proposed cognitive continuum theory which states
that quasi-rationality is an important middle-ground between intuition and analysis and that cognitive performance is dictated
by the match between task properties and mode of cognition. Throughout his career, Hammond moved easily from basic
laboratory work to applied settings, where he resolved policy disputes, and in doing so, he pointed to the dichotomy between
theories of correspondence and coherence. In this paper, we present Hammond’s legacy to a new generation of judgment and
decision making scholars.
Keywords: lens model, policy capturing, cognitive feedback, interpersonal learning, interpersonal conﬂict, social judgment
theory, cognitive continuum theory
1 Introduction
Kenneth R. Hammond [1917–2015] is perhaps one of the
most important ﬁgures in the history of the psychology of
human judgment and decision making. Although his inﬂu-
ence has already been considerable, we anticipate that it will
grow over time because his contributions build on a coher-
ent and comprehensive theoretical framework, which lays a
foundation for the development of a cumulative body of the-
ory and research. It may be challenging, however, for future
generations of scholars to access the breadth and depth of
Hammond’s work, which spanned over seven decades, and
is documented in over 100 articles, seven authored books,
and ﬁve edited volumes. In this paper, our goal is to review
and synthesize Hammond’s major contributions to the study
of human judgment and decision making.
Hammond made at least eight major contributions that
we will discuss. First, he virtually single-handedly kept
Egon Brunswik’s legacy alive in psychology (Hammond,
1966; Hammond & Stewart, 2001b). Hammond built on
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Brunswik’s theory of probabilistic functionalism and his
lens model, and he championed Brunswik’s method of rep-
resentative design. Second, Hammond pioneered the use
of Brunswik’s lens model as a framework for studying how
individuals use information from the task environment to
make clinical judgments (Hammond, 1955). This was the
precursor to what is known today as ‘policy capturing’
and ‘judgment analysis’ research. Third, Hammond for-
mulated the lens model equation which provided a quantita-
tive tool for modeling and analyzing both the task environ-
ment side and human judgment side of the lens model for
studying judgment processes (Hammond, Hursch & Todd,
1964; Hursch, Hammond & Hursch, 1964). Fourth, Ham-
mond employed this equation when examining multiple-cue
probability learning, making contributions regarding the ef-
fects of diﬀerent forms of feedback on learning processes
(Hammond & Summers, 1965; Todd & Hammond, 1965).
Fifth, Hammond extended the application of the lens model
to contexts in which individuals interacted with one an-
other – introducing both the interpersonal learning paradigm
(Hammond, Wilkins & Todd, 1966a) and the interpersonal
conﬂict paradigm (Hammond, 1965; 1972; 1973; Ham-
mond, Todd, Wilkins, &Mitchell, 1966b). Sixth, Hammond
and his colleagues developed social judgment theory (SJT),
which integrated prior work involving the lens model into
a comprehensive quantitative approach for describing judg-
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ment processes and exploringmeans for improving cognitive
performance (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer & Steinmann,
1975). Seventh, grounded in, but going beyond Brunswikian
concepts and SJT, Hammond developed cognitive contin-
uum theory (Hammond, 1996a; 2000a; 2001a; Hammond,
Hamm, Grassia & Pearson, 1987). He proposed that cog-
nition moves along an intuitive-analytical continuum, with
quasi-rationality as amiddle-ground, and that cognitive tasks
induce diﬀerent modes of cognition, implying that cognitive
performance is dictated by the match between properties of
the task and mode of cognition. Finally, Hammond moved
seemingly eﬀortlessly from conducting basic work in the
laboratory to solving applied policy-related problems (Ham-
mond, 1996a; 2007; Hammond&Adelman, 1976). In doing
so, he drew attention to the dichotomy between theories of
correspondence, which focus on empirical reality, and the-
ories of coherence, which focus on internal consistency, as
well as the issues of separating facts from values and bal-
ancing type I and II errors in judgment under uncertainty. In
the remainder of this paper, we discuss each of Hammond’s
major contributions in more detail.
2 Keeping Egon Brunswik’s Legacy
Alive
Hammondwas key to keeping alive and advancing the legacy
of the Austro-Hungarian psychologist Egon Brunswik who
worked largely in the ﬁeld of perception (1940, 1943, 1944,
1952, 1955c, 1955a, 1956; Tolman & Brunswik, 1935; for a
review of Brunswik’s ideas, seeDhami, Hertwig&Hoﬀrage,
2004). Speciﬁcally, Hammond (1966) edited The Psychol-
ogy of Egon Brunswik, which appeared just over a decade
after Brunswik’s untimely death. This volume contained a
eulogy by Edward Tolman; essays on Brunswik’s contribu-
tions to the science of psychology by such luminaries asDon-
ald Campbell, Jane Loevinger, Fritz Heider, Lee Cronbach,
and Roger Barker; four key papers by Brunswik himself;
and a bibliography of Brunswik’s published works. Second,
Hammond co-edited The Essential Brunswik (Hammond &
Stewart, 2001b), which reprinted eighteen of Brunswik’s
major papers accompanied by original commentaries, along
with over two dozen papers discussing Brunswik’s theo-
retical and methodological contributions to psychology and
describing applications of Brunswikian psychology to sub-
stantive problems. This volume also provided a complete
annotated list of Brunswik’s publications. Third, Hammond
established The Brunswik Society, with its associated an-
nual international meeting and newsletter. This provided a
setting for intellectual exchange among the next generation
of neo-Brunswikian scholars.
In addition to his concrete eﬀorts in archiving, preserv-
ing and curating Brunswik’s legacy, Hammond also built
on Brunswik’s work. He was not deterred by the fact that
Brunswik’s ideas were resisted and ignored by his con-
temporaries. Rather, Hammond vigorously championed
Brunswik’s theory of probabilistic functionalism and lens
model, as well as his method of representative design.
Brunswik (1943, 1952) believed that an organism func-
tions to achieve a distal variable in its environment. This
is done by using multiple, proximal cues that may be inter-
correlated and are ultimately fallible. He argued that psy-
chological processes are adapted to the probabilistic envi-
ronments in which an organism functions. Brunswik (1957)
saw the organism and environment as equal partners. Ham-
mond and Stewart (2001a) suggest that the clearest statement
of this fundamental thesis can be found in Brunswik’s (1957,
p. 5) last paper, where he wrote:
. . . .both organism and environment will have to
be seen as systems, each with properties of their
own, yet both hewn from basically the same
block. Each has surface and depth, or overt and
covert regions. . . .the interrelationship between
the two systems has the essential characteristic of
a “coming-to-terms.” And this coming-to-terms is
not merely a matter of mutual boundary or surface
areas. It concerns equally as much, or perhaps
more, the rapport between the central, covert lay-
ers of the two systems. It follow that, much as psy-
chology must be concerned with the texture of the
organism or of its nervous processes and must in-
vestigate them in depth, it must also be concerned
with texture of the environment as it extends in
depth away from the common boundary.
The theory of probabilistic functionalism had analytic and
methodological corollaries. Brunswik (1944, 1955c, 1956)
argued that in order to understand how the organism has
adapted to its environment, researchers should employ the
method of representative design ideally in the form of ran-
domly sampling stimuli from a deﬁned population to which
the researcher wants to generalize. This contrasts from the
commonly used systematic design (i.e., manipulation and
control of selected variables) in psychology. In addition,
Brunswik (1943) noted that in order to measure an individ-
ual’s degree of achievement, the researcher needs to perform
data analysis at the idiographic level. This departs from
nomothetic analysis, which is most commonly used in the
law ﬁnding tradition.
Hammond (1966, p. 16) characterized Brunswik’s theory
of probabilistic functionalism as “an organic whole — a his-
tory, comprehensive theory, and a methodology.” He took
the lead in extending probabilistic function so that it applied
to judgment and decision making processes as well as to
perception, which was Brunswik’s original and primary fo-
cus. In the last few years of his life, Brunswik introduced
the concepts of quasirationality (Brunswik, 1952) and ra-
tiomorphic models of perception and thinking (Brunswik,
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1955b; 1956, pp. 89–93). These nascent eﬀorts were also
advanced by Hammond, and four decades after Brunswik’s
death, Hammond (2001a) chronicled his own success in ap-
plying the lens model to clinical judgment, conducting re-
search on learning under uncertainty, developing a math-
ematical representation of the lens model, expanding this
model to studying interpersonal learning and conﬂict, and
developing cognitive continuum theory.1 We will discuss
these contributions in more detail in subsequent sections of
the paper. But, ﬁrst, we will consider Hammond’s eﬀorts
to translate Brunswik’s method of representative design and
his frustrated struggle to advocate Brunswik’s ideals for a
scientiﬁc psychology.
As Hammond (2001b, 2001c) lamented, representative
design is not well-understood in psychology (see alsoDhami,
2011; Dhami et al., 2004; Gigerenzer, 2001). Hammond
(2001b; p. 134) pointed out that it does not refer to:
. . . a demand for representation of the “real world”
(a meaningless concept) but. . . to the extent to
which the statistical properties of the laboratory
task represent the statistical properties of the situ-
ation to which the results are to be generalized. In
short, the same logic that is used to justify gener-
alization over a subject population should be used
to justify generalization over the task situation.
Hammond was tenacious in his promotion of representa-
tive design. It was a key element of his ﬁrst paper (Ham-
mond, 1948), a key element of his last (posthumous) paper
(Hammond&Lang, 2017) andmany papers in between (e.g.,
Hammond, 1996b). In particular, he clariﬁed and further de-
veloped Brunswik’s ideas regarding representative design by
distinguishing between substantive situational sampling and
formal situational sampling (Hammond, 1966, 1972).
Formal situational sampling refers to the formal properties
of the task (i.e., number of cues, their values, distributions,
inter-correlations, and ecological validities), irrespective of
content. The formal properties deﬁne the universe of stim-
ulus (or situation) populations. For instance, cue number,
values, and distributions range from 0 to inﬁnity, and the
ecological validities of cues and their inter-correlations range
from -1 to 1. Any population of situations lies within these
boundaries. A researcher who uses formal situational sam-
pling can sample various combinations of formal properties.
Formal situational sampling permits the construction and
presentation of stimuli that are formally representative of
the natural stimulus population. In order to discover what
the formal properties of the task are, it is often necessary to
conduct a task analysis prior to the study. This may involve
interviews with those who are familiar or experienced with
the task, observations of individuals performing the task,
1Hammond continued to perform idiographic analysis (but see Ham-
mond et al., 1975), as Brunswik suggested, despite its time-consuming and
somewhat tedious nature.
document analyses of past case records and a review of the
extant literature on the task.
An example of the use of formal situational sampling can
be found in Hammond et al.’s (1987) study of 21 expert
highway engineers judging highway safety. The distal cri-
terion was the rate of accidents divided by the number of
miles travelled, averaged over 7 years, for each of 40 high-
ways. The highways were described in terms of 10 cues (e.g.,
lane width) that highway safety experts identiﬁed as essen-
tial for judging road safety. The values, inter-correlations,
distributions, and ecological validities of the eight cues were
deduced from highway department records, and properties
of two cues were measured by the experimenters from visual
inspection of videotapes of each highway. The researchers
were primarily interested in examining how presentation of
the task aﬀects the mode of cognition used (e.g., analytical
versus intuitive), and so the cue information for each highway
was presented via ﬁlmstrips, bar graphs, and formulas.
Despite Hammond’s proposal to use formal situational
sampling, as Brehmer (1979, p. 198) argued, there is “no
easy road to success”. The number of all possible combina-
tions of variables may be extremely large, and the researcher
needs to know which combinations should be studied. The
problem of deﬁning a reference class or sampling frame re-
mains. In a review, Dhami et al. (2004) revealed that when
trying to capture judgment processes, few researchers had
used representative design either in terms of sampling real
stimuli from the environment (for some exceptions, see Kir-
lic, 2006) or in terms of constructing stimuli to be formally
representative of the environment. Hammond (1996b, p.
245) himself confessed that he had not always been faithful
to the method of representative design and explained that
this was because, like Brunswik, if he had done so, “I would
become isolated and ostracized.”2
3 Clinical Judgment, Policy Captur-
ing and Judgment Analysis
Hammond (1955) was the ﬁrst to use the lens model outside
the study of perception. He pioneered the use of Brunswik’s
(1952) lens model (see Figure 1) in the study of clinical
judgment, employing it as a framework for studying how
individuals use information from the task environment to
make clinical judgments. This work was the precursor to
‘policy capturing’/‘judgment analysis’ research mentioned
earlier.
2Hammond was thanked by researchers who later drew on Brunswik’s
idea of representative stimulus sampling to critique the extant work on cog-
nitive biases such as overconﬁdence (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoﬀrage & Klein-
bolting, 1991; see also Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 2000). Simply put, it
was found that biases were reduced if researchers employed representative
rather than systematic stimulus sampling.
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Figure 1: The Lens Model (adapted from Brunswik, 1952).
In his 1955 landmark paper, Hammond shifted attention
away from the practice of solely studying the accuracy of
clinical judgment to also explaining how clinicians achieve
accuracy.3 This was a fundamental shift in focus because “it
is suggested that the clinician not be considered a reader of
instruments, but an instrument to be understood in terms of
a probability model” (Hammond, 1955, p. 262). Hammond
argued that the clinician and the patient are two diﬀerent, but
interacting systems that should be considered as a whole,
and so research should examine the relations between a clin-
ician and his or her environment (i.e., patients). He further
pointed out that the clinician’s judgment process is often
‘quasi-rational’ and diﬃcult to communicate because it is
a result of the process of vicarious functioning. The term
quasi-rational was ﬁrst used by Brunswik (1952) to describe
cognitive processes that were intermediate between intuitive
3At about the same time, Meehl (1954) published an inﬂuential book
comparing clinical versus actuarial prediction, concluding that statistical
predictions typically outperformed clinical judgment.
and analytical poles, and Hammond elaborated this concept
in other work (Hammond, 1996a; Hammond et al., 1987),
which we will return to later.
Brunswik (1956, 1957) used the concept of vicarious
functioning to describe how, in an uncertain environment
in which no proximal cue is a perfectly valid and reliable in-
dicator of the distal state, organisms learn to rely on multiple
cues of partial but imperfect validity and reliability. Vicar-
ious functioning is essential in clinical judgment because
clients may present a set of symptoms that may change over
time ormay present symptoms diﬀerent from those presented
by another client who is suﬀering the same problem. Ham-
mond also argued that a clinician’s capacity for dealing with
the intersubstitutability of cues, over encounters with a series
of patients, should be studied using representative design.
Hammond’s points are illustrated in two studies conducted
by his students (Herring, 1954; Todd, 1954, see also Ham-
mond, 1955). In the ﬁrst study, Todd (1954) asked 10 clini-
cians to judge the intelligence (as measured by an IQ test) of
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78 patients using a Rorschach test. The IQ test score was the
objective outcome criterion. Achievement was measured in
terms of the correlation between the clinician’s judgments
made over a set of clients and their IQ test scores. Em-
ulating Brunswik’s (1940) approach, correlational statistics
were used to capture the relationships between cues and judg-
ments (cue utilization), cues and the environmental criterion
(ecological validity), as well as inter-cue correlations.
Hammond noted that the clinicians’ performance im-
proved when they had access to more information. The
median correlation between judgments and IQ scores rose
from 0.47 to 0.64 when clinicians had access to the ver-
bal protocol data from the Rorschach. Then, using the four
most valid cues as predictors, a multiple linear regression
equation was computed for the environment (i.e., capturing
the relations between the patients’ IQ scores and the four
Rorschach cues) and separate equations were computed for
each clinician (i.e., capturing the relations between each clin-
ician’s judgments of IQ and the four Rorschach cues). Each
model revealed the relative weights attached to the cues. The
model of the environment was then compared to each clini-
cian’s model.4 Thematch between the twomodels explained
how the clinicians attained their level of achievement. The
multiple R for the model of the environment was 0.479 and
the median correlation between the clinicians’ judgments of
IQ and the IQ test score was 0.470. The ecological validities
of the four cues in the environment, each clinician’s utiliza-
tion validities of the four cues, the inter-correlations among
the four cues in the environment and as used by each clin-
ician, were also elicited. There were variations among the
clinicians in terms of the cues they used. “Certain clinicians
were found to be using invalid cues, others neglected the
valid ones” (Hammond, 1955, p. 261).
In his study of clinical judgment, Hammond also demon-
strated that the multiple linear regression model could pre-
dict human (clinical) judgment. A model was developed
for each clinician on 39 patients and cross-validated on a
further 39 patients (i.e., it made predictions of each clini-
cian’s judgments on a set of new cases). The median cor-
relation between the models’ predictions and the clinicians’
judgments on the new cases was 0.85. Hammond (1955,
p. 261) concluded that “evidently the multiple correlation
model which predicts that the clinician combines the data
from the Rorschach in a linear, additive fashion is a good
one – it predicts quite successfully in comparison with most
psychological eﬀorts.”
In the second study, Herring (1954) asked clinicians to
judge patients’ responses to surgical anesthesia using their
psychological test results. No objective outcome criterion
was available and so analysis of the environment side of the
lens model and consequently achievement was not possible.
4WhereasMeehl (1954) had compared the clinician to a statistical model
of the environment, Hammond (1955), compared a statistical model of the
clinician to a statistical model of the environment.
Instead, Hammond demonstrated how the correspondence or
agreement between the judgments of two clinicians (a medic
and a psychologist) could be studied by examining the match
between their regression models. Brunswik (1956, p. 30)
had also noted that correlations could be used to measure
“agreement among judges.”
In his ﬁrst successful application of the regression model
to clinical judgment, Hammond (1955, p. 261) was cautious
in noting that the analyses merely demonstrated that it was
possible to construct “some probability model” that captured
the essential elements of the lensmodel. Over time, however,
the similarity between the multiple linear regression model
of the environment and of the clinician’s judgments ledHam-
mond et al. (1964, p. 444) to conclude that “The clinicians’
inferential processes were nearly identical with the multiple-
regression procedure both in function and in content.” When
proposing further studies, they stated that “We are conﬁdent
that . . . such studies will ﬁnd small diﬀerences between the
cognitive processes of the clinician, or any human subject,
and the multiple-regression equation” (p. 452). Later, how-
ever, Hammond (1996b, pp. 244–245) confessed that: “a
[. . . ] sin of commission on my part was to overemphasise
the role of themultiple regression (MR) technique as amodel
for organising information from multiple fallible indicators
into a judgment. There is nothing within the framework of
the Lens Model that demands that MR be the one and only
model of that organising process.” Researchers have now
successfully developed and tested non-statistical alternatives
to the regression model within the lens model context (e.g.,
Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer
& Goldstein, 1996).
Hammond’s ground-breaking 1955 paper presaged two
related, but distinguishable threads of work. In one thread,
exempliﬁed by the Todd study, the focus is onmodelling both
the human judgment and environment side of the lens model,
as well as the interaction between them, consistent with the
fundamental tenets of Brunswik’s probabilistic functional-
ism. In the other thread, reﬂected by the Herring study, the
emphasis on the environmental system recedes (because it is
unknowable, unavailable or not of interest), and the spotlight
is on how individual judges weight and combine information
to make judgments. This latter situation represents what
has been called the single-system design (Cooksey, 1996;
Hammond, 2001a) of the lens model (see Figure 2) and is
associated with the policy-capturing/judgment-analysis ap-
proach (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Stewart, 1988), which
we discuss in more detail below.
In the single-systems design there is no outcome criterion,
or at least none that is immediately available, so researchers
simply describe an individual’s judgment policy. As Cook-
sey (1996) points out, the single-system design is not truly
Brunswikian because when the environment is unknown or
unmeasurable, it does not allow for an examination of the
interrelationships between the judge’s cognitive system and
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Figure 2: Lens Model for single-systems design.
the task system. Nonetheless, Hammond (2001a) noted that
the single-system design is the most widely used version of
the lens model. Dhami et al. (2004) also observed that much
of the subsequent research within SJT, developed by Ham-
mond and his colleagues, which we discuss later, uses this
design.
The single-system design may be appropriate because an
outcome criterion is unavailable, for a variety of valid rea-
sons, as enumerated by Cooksey (1996). First, an outcome
criterion may not be useful or appropriate because no deﬁni-
tive, correct answer is available or ascertainable. In or-
der to overcome problems in obtaining an outcome crite-
rion, some studies have used expert judgments to provide
proxies for environmental criterion measures (e.g., Adel-
man & Mumpower, 1979; Hammond & Adelman, 1976;
Mumpower & Adelman, 1980). Second, an outcome crite-
rion may be diﬃcult to obtain due to concerns with ethics
or legality. Third, an outcome criterion may be unavailable
during the study period. Fourth, studies using hypothetical
cases or cases that represent future situations, by their very
nature preclude the use of an outcome criterion. Finally, an
outcome criterion may not be included because it is irrel-
evant to the research goal since researchers wish solely to
study agreement.
As mentioned above, analyses of how judges weight and
combine information tomake judgments in the single-system
design have come to be known to as policy capturing and
judgment analysis both within and outside5 the Brunswikian
5There is a large body of basic and applied psychological research that
arose independently, and has little or no apparent connection to Brunswik or
Hammond. Some have argued that the history of policy capturing research
and SJT traditions. A large body of research has emerged,
and in Brehmer and Joyce’s (1988) edited volume calledHu-
man Judgment: The SJT View that summarizes advances
since Hammond et al.’s (1975) introduction of SJT, there is
both a chapter on judgment analysis (Stewart, 1988) and a
chapter on policy capturing (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988).
The former chapter acknowledges that the topic of that chap-
ter is sometimes also called ‘policy capturing’ and the latter
chapter similarly acknowledges that the focus of the chapter
is sometimes referred to as ‘judgment analysis’.6
Judgment analysis and policy capturing have been fully ex-
plicated by a number of scholars (Brehmer&Brehmer, 1988;
Cooksey, 1996; Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart, 1988). A
study by Dhami and Ayton (2001) provides an example of
the primary features of this approach. They studied British
judges’ bail decisions. Through a postal survey, 81 judges
were presented with a set of 41 hypothetical cases. These
were described in terms of nine cues (e.g., seriousness of
oﬀence, community ties). The cues were identiﬁed follow-
ing a review of the literature on bail, legal guidelines and
training, interviews with judges, and observations of bail
hearings. Each cue itself varied (e.g., the strength of com-
munity ties cue was dichotomous and described as strong
or weak). Other cues (e.g., length of adjournment) were
held constant and provided background information to all
the cases. The judges were ﬁrst asked to make a decision
on each case (i.e., bail unconditionally, bail with conditions,
and remand in custody). They were then asked to rate how
conﬁdent they were in their decision. After making their de-
cisions, the judges were asked to rank the cues in order of the
importance attached to them when making their decisions.
Seven of the 41 cases were duplicates used to measure test-
retest consistency in decisions, and seven were holdouts used
for model validation. Finally, studies interested in achieve-
ment would also document the outcome (or criterion) for
each case, although this was not possible for Dhami and
Ayton (2001).
Once the judgment data has been collected, judgment poli-
cies are captured for each individual.7 Traditionally, poli-
cies are captured using multiple linear regression statistics
(Cooksey, 1996; Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart, 1988). The
criterion (dependent) variable is the judgment and the cues
dates back to Wallace (1923) who is often credited with pioneering such
eﬀorts in his study of corn judges in which he tried to capture ‘what is in the
corn judge’s mind?’ The term policy capturing was coined by Bottenberg
and Christal (1961), and refers to the analysis of judgment data using
multiple regression techniques. Judgment analysis (originally called JAN)
was coined by Christal (1963), and refers to the combined use of policy
capturing and policy clustering methods.
6Cooksey (1996, pp. 57–58) provides an informative discussion of the
points of intersection and divergence between the strands of policy capturing
and judgment analysis research closely linked to the Brunswikian and SJT
tradition and those that are outside that tradition.
7In some studies, aggregate or composite policies may be captured
(Hammond et al., 1975), although this departs from Brunswik’s (1943) call
for analysis to be at the idiographic level.
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are the predictor (independent) variables. An individual’s
judgments are regressed on the cues. This procedure yields a
weighted linear model that can be cross-validated, and which
describes an individual’s judgment policy in terms of statis-
tically signiﬁcant cues in the model, relative cue weights, the
form of the function relating the cues to the judgments (e.g.,
linear), the rule used to integrate the cues into a judgment
(i.e., additive), and an individual’s predictability as mea-
sured by the model (i.e., R2). Inter-individual diﬀerences (or
agreement) in decisions and policies may then be examined.
Participants’ ‘insight’ into their decision making may also
be examined by comparing their self-reported policies with
their model. Finally, intra-individual inconsistency in mak-
ing decisions may be studied by comparing the decisions
made in the test-retest situations.
Although there are exceptions, as Brehmer and Brehmer
(1988) point out, reviews of judgment analysis and policy
capturing research have generally concluded that the studies
have yielded consistent ﬁndings, irrespective of the num-
ber and type of decision makers sampled, and the nature
and content of the judgment tasks involved (Brehmer, 1994;
Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Camerer, 1981; Cooksey, 1996;
Libby & Lewis, 1982; Hammond et al., 1975; Karelaia &
Hogarth, 2008; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971).8 Studies have
typically found that the multiple linear regression model is
a descriptively valid model as it provides an adequate ﬁt to
individuals’ judgment data. Researchers have suggested that
a high R2 implies that judgments are the result of a linear
additive process (Hammond et al., 1964. However, as we
pointed out earlier, Hammond recognized the paramorphic
nature of the regression model, and other researchers have
since successfully captured human judgment policies us-
ing non-statistical and even non-compensatory models (e.g.,
Dhami&Ayton, 2001; Dhami&Harries, 2001, 2010). Gerd
Gigerenzer and his colleagues initiated a program of research
modeling the task environment, in which they demonstrate
the descriptive and predictive utility of simple (non-statistical
and sometimes non-compensatory) models, called ‘fast and
frugal’ heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Re-
search Group, 1999; see also Gigerenzer, Hertwig & Pachur,
2011).
The regressionmodel indicates the number of cues used by
an individual (i.e., those that have statistically signiﬁcant beta
weights), the relative weights of the cues (i.e., beta weights)
and the direction in which cues were used (i.e., the sign of
8Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) reviewed studies conducted in what they
called the correlational and analysis of variance paradigms. Hammond et al.
(1975) reviewed experimental studies in the multiple-cue probability learn-
ing, and the interpersonal learning and interpersonal conﬂict paradigms.
Libby and Lewis (1982) reviewed studies conducted in the domains of ac-
counting and auditing. The reviews by Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) and
Brehmer (1994) focused on studies involving participants experienced with
the judgment task being studied. Finally, Cooksey (1996) reviewed studies
employing the single-systems, double-systems, triple-systems, N-systems
and hierarchical designs (we shall say more about these designs later).
the beta weight). It has typically been found that regres-
sion models contain on average three cues (Brehmer, 1994;
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Most studies have reported
that participants do not use all of the cues available. Studies
have often found that a few cues are weighted more heavily
than the others. These ﬁndings on cue use are compatible
with the more recent research demonstrating the descriptive
validity of non-compensatory models that imply judgments
may be based on only one cue (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001;
Dhami & Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Hammond et al. (1975) proposed that consistency should
be measured in terms of the variance of judgments made
in a test-retest situation. Studies using such measures of
consistency have often correlated the two sets of decisions,
although other indices of agreement may also be used (e.g.,
Gillis, Lipkin & Moran, 1981). It has generally been found
that correlations aremoderate for themajority of participants
in a study. Note that inconsistency implies some degree of
judgment inaccuracy.
Researchers have also compared the captured policieswith
individuals’ stated policies, as elicited by various direct re-
port methods.9 The subjective cueweightsmay be compared
with statistical weights derived from the regression model,
the ﬁt of models containing each set of weights may be com-
pared, or the predictions made by the two sets of weights
may be compared (Reilly & Doherty, 1992). According to
some, such comparisons provide a measure of an individ-
ual’s insight into his or her judgment policy (e.g., Ullman
& Doherty, 1984). Todd (1954; see also Hammond, 1955
and Summers, Taliaferro & Fletcher, 1970) had found that
his participants were not able to accurately articulate the
weights they attached to the cues. However, acknowledging
that direct methods may provide an unreliable and invalid
method for demonstrating self-insight because of the diﬃ-
culties in introspection and articulating policies, Reilly and
Doherty (1989, 1992) proposed an alternative method, i.e.,
policy recognition. Here, participants are asked to identify
their own policy, deﬁned in terms of cue weights, from a set
of other policies. This method indicates a greater degree of
insight, as participants were quite successful in recognizing
their own policies.
4 The Lens Model Equation
Hammond and his colleagues introduced the lens model
equation (Hammond et al., 1964; Hursch et al., 1964) to
9The policy captured by the regression model is also referred to as a
tacit, implicit or objective policy, and the individual’s own statement of
policy is also called his or her explicit or subjective policy. Cook and
Stewart (1975) found little diﬀerence amongst seven diﬀerent direct report
procedures, namely distributing 100 points among cues, rating cues on a
100 point scale, paired comparison ratings of cues, ratio comparison ratings
of cues, the number of times cues were inﬂuential, aggregation of judgments
made using each cue one at a time on each case, and aggregation of ratings
of each cue’s contribution to the judgment of each case.
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the study of judgment processes. This equation provided
the requisite quantitative tool for modeling and analyzing
both the environment side and the human judgment side of
Brunswik’s lens model. The lens model equation is the an-
alytic complement of the conceptual framework articulated
in the lens model. The original formulation by Hursch et
al. (1964) was simpliﬁed by Tucker (1964), whose version is
shown in Equation 1 (see also Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).
ra = GReRs + C
√
1 − R2
e
√
1 − R2
s
(1)
Here, ra represents achievement, and is measured by the
correlation between the judgments and the criterion.
Re represents the predictability of the environment and
thus the upper limit of achievement. It is measured by the
linearmultiple correlation between the cues and the criterion.
Rs represents an individual’s ability to utilize his or her
knowledge of the task in a consistentmanner, and ismeasured
by the linear multiple correlation between the cues and the
judgments.
G represents the match of the linear components of the
two models, namely the model of the environment and of
the individual. It is measured by the correlation between
the linearly predictable variance in the environment and the
linearly predictable variance in the individual’s judgments.
C represents the non-linear component of achievement,
and is measured by the correlation between the residuals
from the linear regressions of the environment and the indi-
vidual.
Each of the major statistical terms of the lens model equa-
tion can be directly translated into the conceptual framework
of Brunswik’s lens model itself. Achievement (ra) is deter-
mined by an individual’s ability to detect and utilize both
linear and non-linear patterns in the environment. Stew-
art (1988) notes that in most judgment tasks, the non-linear
component is so small as to be negligible. If the non-linear
component is large, it indicates that the multiple linear re-
gression model is not capturing all of the consistent variation
in judgment.
Task predictability (Re) is measured in terms of the lin-
ear multiple correlation between the cues and the criterion.
Perfect achievement is not possible when Re is less than 1.
It is not possible to be always correct in a world that is not
perfectly consistent. Task predictability thus sets an upper
mathematical bound on achievement; ra ≤ Re. Brehmer
(1970, 1972, 1973b) demonstrated that not only does Re
set an upper bound on ra, but that lower levels of task pre-
dictability tend to induce sub-optimal levels of achievement.
This happens because less predictable tasks tend to elicit
lower levels of cognitive control, Rs . Brehmer (1976) sug-
gests that judges become less consistent as they modify their
judgment policies in order to try to achieve higher levels of
achievement, but due to task uncertainty they receive noisy
feedback, making it diﬃcult to assess whether changes in
judgment policy have led to improved performance. As
summarized by Stewart, Roebber, and Bosart (1997, p. 206),
“Not only does task predictability place an upper bound on
potential accuracy . . . , but a number of studies have found
evidence that the reliability of judgment is lower for less
predictable tasks . . . Judges respond to unpredictable tasks
by behaving less predictably themselves.”
Cognitive control (Rs) refers to the relationship between
an individual’s judgments and environmental cues. It is
measured in terms of the linear multiple correlation between
cues and judgments. Building on earlier work, Hammond
and Summers (1972) proposed that performance in cognitive
tasks involves two distinct processes: acquisition of knowl-
edge and cognitive control over knowledge already acquired.
Just as task predictability places an upper bound on achieve-
ment, so does cognitive control. Cognitive control sets an
upper mathematical bound on achievement; ra ≤ Rs . In
subsequent work, Hammond and colleagues (Hammond et
al., 1975) distinguished between cognitive control and con-
sistency. Cognitive control refers to the similarity between
an individual’s judgments and predictions of the best-ﬁtting
model of that individual. Consistency refers to the simi-
larity between repeated judgments made on identical cases.
Consistency places an upper bound on cognitive control.
Knowledge (G) is assessed in terms of the correlation be-
tween the best ﬁtting model of the human system and the
best ﬁtting model of the environmental system. It represents
the achievement that would be attained if both the model
of the judge and the task were executed with perfect con-
trol. In general, G will be maximized when the judge’s cue
utilizations (weights and function forms) parallel the eco-
logical validities of the environmental cues, presuming that
the judge uses the same organizing principle to combine the
information into an overall judgment as is found in the en-
vironmental system. As Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) note,
however, it is possible for judges to obtain high levels of
G, even when the cue utilizations do not precisely match
the ecological validities. This can happen when inter-cue
correlations are high.
Finally, C is also a measure of knowledge. It represents
the consistent non-linear variation shared between the indi-
vidual and environment that is not captured by the regression
models.
Cooksey (1996, p. 165, words in square brackets added)
sums up the situation nicely:
The LME [lens model equation] is an elegant, pre-
cise mathematical formulation of a simple truth.
That is, a person’s ability to make correct judg-
ments about reality is a function of three things:
(1) how predictable the world is (Re), (2) how well
the person knows the world (G and C), and (3)
how consistently the person can apply his or her
knowledge (Rs).
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In the ﬁrst application of the lens model equation, Ham-
mond et al. (1964) reanalyzed data from a study byGrebstein
(1963), who compared naïve, semi-sophisticated and sophis-
ticated clinicians’ predictions of 30 patients’ IQ test scores
using 10 cues from patients’ Rorschach tests. Grebstein had
concluded that performance did not increase with experience
and that there was room for improvement. Hammond et al.
(1964) used the lens model equation to determine the upper
limit of achievement for this task and found that Re was 0.79.
They also demonstrated that the three groups of clinicians
did not diﬀer in terms of Rs , or C as all groups were highly
linear. The three groups did, however, diﬀer in terms of G
because clinicians in the more sophisticated groups exhib-
ited a greater match between the ecological validities of the
cues and their utilization validities.
Once individuals’ judgment policies have been captured,
they can be compared with the model of the task, in order to
examine individual achievement. As mentioned, the upper
limit of achievement is dependent upon that aﬀorded by
the task. Libby and Lewis (1982) concluded that studies
in accounting (in particular prediction of business failure
and prediction of security return) reported high levels of
achievement. Overall, studies comparing judgments against
an outcome criterion have demonstrated fairly high levels of
achievement or judgmental accuracy as measured by the lens
model equation; ra averaged 0.56 among the 249 studies in
a meta-analytic review by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008).
Since the ﬁrst studies were conducted over 50 years ago,
an extensive body of research has used or referred to the lens
model equation. The precise number of studies is diﬃcult
to estimate accurately, but eﬀorts to compile bibliographies
(Holzworth, 1999) and to conduct meta-analyses (Karelaia
& Hogarth, 2008) provide evidence that there are hundreds
of such studies, at a minimum. Methodologically, Castel-
lan (1973, 1992), Cooksey and Freebody (1985), Stewart
(1976, 1988, 1990) and Stewart and Lusk (1994), among
others, have made important modiﬁcations, suggested sig-
niﬁcant extensions, or examined the statistical and empirical
behavior of parameters of the lens model equation.
By extending Brunswik’s lens model from the study of
perception to judgment, and then formulating the lens model
equation, Hammond opened up the possibility of new re-
search approaches and agendas. These tools could be used to
study how individuals learn tomake judgments in probabilis-
tic multiple-cue learning situations. We discuss this topic in
the next session. Second, these tools oﬀered the opportunity
to study inter-individual (dis)agreement in judgment, inter-
personal learning, and interpersonal conﬂict. This topic is
discussed in the subsequent section.
5 Multiple-Cue Probability Learning
The lens model equation enabled Hammond to undertake a
program of research on multiple-cue probability learning in
which he and others made numerous contributions. Holz-
worth (1999) provides a good overview of these eﬀorts:
Cue probability learning involves an organism at-
tempting to achieve (learn) a relationship with
some distal criterion variable by attending to one
or more multiple fallible indicators (diﬀerentially
valid cues). Smedslund (1955) conducted the ﬁrst
multiple and single cue probability learning study
after Brunswik (Brunswik & Herma, 1951), but
it was Hammond and his students in the United
States (Hammond, Hursch & Todd, 1964; Hursch,
Hammond&Hursch, 1964), andBjörkman (1965)
and his student Brehmer (1972) in Sweden who
initiated extensive programs of research. During a
typical cue probability learning experiment a per-
son makes judgments based on some number of
probabilistic cues over a series of trials. The ob-
ject is to correctly predict the quantitative or cate-
gorical criterion value on each trial. Cues diﬀer in
terms of their relevance (ecological validity) to the
criterion. Trial by trial (outcome) feedback may
be given on each trial, and/or cognitive feedback
may be given after subsets of trials. Cognitive
feedback concerns characteristics of the person’s
cognitive processes as well as characteristics of the
task ecology.
In one of the earliest multiple-cue probability learning
studies, Hammond and Summers (1965) gave three groups
diﬀerent amounts of information about the task in addition
to diﬀerent amounts/forms of outcome feedback (i.e., no
information, information that the task contained linear and
non-linear cue-criterion function forms, and information that
in addition identiﬁed the linear and non-linear cues). They
asked individuals to predict a criterion value from two cues,
one linearly related to the criterion and one non-linearly
related. All groups showed learning over ﬁve blocks of
20 trials and all groups learned to use the linear cue more
eﬃciently than the non-linear cue. However, individuals
in the group given the most information showed a greater
degree of achievement and were more likely to learn to use
the non-linear cue. The two groups who were provided
information about the task were also better at learning the
ecological validities of the cues.
Holzworth’s 1999 annotated bibliography identiﬁed 315
studies of single- and multiple-cue probability learning con-
ducted up to that date. Several important empirical regular-
ities have emerged from the literature. For instance, people
can learn positive cue-criterion relations faster than negative
ones; they can slowly learn to track changes in relative cue
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2018 Kenneth R. Hammond’s contribution to JDM 10
weights over time; they can learn to use cues faster than
learning function forms; and they typically do not use cue
redundancies eﬀectively (Klayman, 1988; Slovic & Licht-
enstein, 1971). Generally speaking, the ﬁndings from the
multiple-cue probability learning paradigm indicate that in-
dividuals can learn about the formal properties of the task
such as cue validities and linearity of cues and adapt to
them, although learning tends to be better and faster when
task predictability (Re) is higher (Brehmer, 1973a; 1974).
It has also been shown that people ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to
learn non-linear cue-criterion relations than linear ones and
they experience diﬃculty in applying knowledge about non-
linear relations consistently (Deane, Hammond & Summers,
1972).
Hammond initiated a line of research within the multiple-
cue probability learning paradigm that proved to be of partic-
ular consequence. This concerned the distinction between,
and diﬀerential eﬀects of, outcome versus cognitive feed-
back. It was clear from Hammond and Summers’ (1965)
study that providing information about properties of the
task in addition to traditional outcome feedback improved
learning. Thus, Todd and Hammond (1965) developed the
procedure of cognitive feedback (sometimes also known as
lens model feedback).10 This involves providing informa-
tion about the formal properties of the task, the individual’s
judgment policy (i.e., utilization validities, Rs , consistency
and cue-judgment function forms), and the match between
properties of the environment and the individual’s judg-
ment policy (i.e., achievement, G and C; Balzer, Doherty
& O’Connor, 1989; Doherty & Balzer, 1988).
Todd and Hammond (1965) provided participants with
feedback on their level of achievement, cue utilization va-
lidities and the ecological validities of the cues, for each of
eight blocks of 25 trials. They found that cognitive feedback
led to signiﬁcantly greater achievement than did outcome
feedback,11 and concluded that cognitive feedback enables
people to compare their understanding of the task and dis-
cover where theywere using cues inappropriately. This study
was followed by a series of additional ones which revealed
that participants given only outcome feedback learned less
rapidly than those given cognitive feedback (Deane et al.,
1972; Hammond, 1971; Hammond & Boyle, 1971; Ham-
mond, Summers & Deane, 1973).
Other research has found that providing both cognitive
feedback in the context of outcome feedback may actu-
ally impair performance (Holzworth & Doherty, 1976); that
learning is slow and diﬃcult with outcome feedback alone
(Brehmer, 1980; Klayman, 1988);12 and that cognitive feed-
10Cognitive feedback is the term used when information about past events
is provided and cognitive feedforward refers to information about future
events (Doherty & Balzer, 1988).
11Newton (1965) had demonstrated that the sole provision of cognitive
feedback (i.e., ecological validities of cues and the utilization validities)
could signiﬁcantly improve performance.
12Unfortunately, this latter situation reﬂects how learning may take
back is superior to no feedback at all (Doherty & Balzer,
1988). Unlike cognitive feedback, in stable environments,
outcome feedback does not provide information useful for
making future judgments.
The usefulness of cognitive feedback, however, may need
to be buttressed by other information. Balzer et al. (1989)
concluded that providing people with information about the
characteristics of their own judgment performance but not
about the appropriateness of that performance does little
to improve performance compared to providing information
about the characteristics of the task. More recently, Kare-
laia and Hogarth (2008) concluded that information about
the task was more useful than feedback about the judgment
policy alone, or simply outcome feedback. As Brehmer
(1979) points out, in real world conditions feedback is not
always available and people are not consciously trying to
learn the task. In fact, analyzing feedback requires cognitive
resources, which may be lacking in complex tasks (Harvey,
2011).
6 Interpersonal Learning and Inter-
personal Conflict
Among Hammond’s most signiﬁcant contributions was his
extension of the lens model to social contexts in which indi-
viduals learn from or about one another, or are in judgment
conﬂict with one another. Brunswik’s probabilistic func-
tionalism is based on the double-system lens case, where the
two focal systems are the individual and the environment.
This asocial focus is unsurprising given that Brunswik was
primarily concerned with perception. For Brunswik (1956,
p. 35), the study of agreement was the only time when more
than one individual was “brought into the picture.”
In an innovative and revolutionary development, Ham-
mondmoved the lensmodel into a social context, introducing
both the interpersonal learning (IPL) paradigm (Hammond,
1972; Hammond et al., 1966a; see also Earle, 1973) and in-
terpersonal conﬂict (IPC) paradigm (Hammond, 1965, 1973;
Hammond et al., 1966b). The triple-system lens model
for the IPL and IPC paradigms is shown in Figure 3. In
Hammond’s (2001a, p. 471) own view, the triple-system
case represented “perhaps the most important expansion of
Brunswik’s lens model. It is possibly one that Brunswik did
not anticipate.”
In both the IPL and IPC paradigms, the judges face a
common task, where there is an environmental criterion with
which multiple, proximal cues are imperfectly associated.
Judges attempt to infer the value of the criterion on the basis
of available cues. The IPL and IPC paradigms share much in
common. The main diﬀerences lie in the speciﬁc elements
of the triple-system case where attention is focused. In the
place outside the laboratory (Anderson, Deane, Hammond, McClelland
& Shanteau, 1981).
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Figure 3: Lens model for study of interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict (adapted from Hammond [1965] and
Hammond et al. [1966b]).
IPL paradigm, the focus may be either on learning about or
learning from the other person, whereas in the IPC paradigm,
the focus is on reducing disagreement with the other person.
We present these two paradigms below.
Interpersonal learning about the other person is focused
on understanding the other person and developing the abil-
ity to predict how he or she will respond to the task. The
ability to predict accurately the other person’s judgments re-
quires an understanding of the weights, function forms, and
organizing principle that the other person uses to combine
information from cues into a judgment. Prediction accuracy
is also constrained by the degree of cognitive control the
other person exercises in making judgments. The other per-
son’s Rs plays the same role as Re does in the two-system
case, constraining the upper limit of achievement.
In one of the original interpersonal learning studies, Ham-
mond et al. (1966b) found that, on average, paired partici-
pants were able to predict one another’s responses quite well,
as well as one another’s diﬀerential cue weights, linear (al-
though not to the extent hypothesized), and non-linear cue
use. Participants were also more likely to learn about the
other person if that person was more reliable, and through
interaction each pair’s policy similarity increased.
Some research on interpersonal learning about the other
person has focused on the ability to predict another’s judg-
ments when there is no common environmental criterion,
for instance, in negotiation, when the relevant judgments are
about the desirability of potential settlements (Balke, Ham-
mond & Meyer, 1973; Miller, 1973; Mumpower, Sheﬃeld,
Darling & Milter, 2004).
Research on interpersonal learning from the other per-
son focuses on understanding how a judge learns about a
task by observing the judgments that another person makes.
Clearly, interpersonal learning from the other person is not
independent of interpersonal learning about the other person
— to learn about the task from another person, one needs to
learn how the other person interacts with the task. The other
person must convey relevant information about the task for
interpersonal learning to be better than individual-only task
learning.
Hammond (1972) found that function forms aﬀected cue
utilization validities where, for instance, after interpersonal
learning, individuals trained to use a non-linear cue could
give up reliance on that cue and learn to use a linear cue faster
than individuals trained to use a linear cue. In a set of three
experiments, Earle (1973) reported that participants taught
to rely solely on linear cues required interpersonal learning
from participants using non-linear cues in order to switch
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to using non-linear ones, but not vice versa. Interpersonal
learning was also necessary for learning negative linear or
non-linear rules.
Research has also investigated the eﬀects of task charac-
teristics on interpersonal learning and found the eﬀects to be
similar to those found in the multiple-cue probability learn-
ing paradigm, with the exception that non-linear policies are
easier to learn through interpersonal learning (Hammond et
al., 1975). Cognitive feedback has also been shown to be
useful in interpersonal learning tasks (Balke et al., 1973;
Miller, 1973).
Judges may ﬁnd themselves in false agreement, impeding
interpersonal learning, when they reach similar judgments
despite diﬀerent polices because of high levels of inter-cue
correlations (Mumpower & Hammond, 1974). On the other
hand, lack of cognitive control means that parties may dis-
agree in practice even though they agree in principle, re-
ferred to as false disagreement (Dhami & Olsson, 2008).
These latter observations lead us to describe Hammond’s
IPC paradigm.
Research in the IPC paradigm ismotivated byHammond’s
observation (1965, 1973; Hammond et al., 1966b) that not
all conﬂict and disagreement stem from diﬀerences in in-
centives or motivations. Cognitive conﬂict may arise due
to diﬀerences in what people “believe to be the eﬃcient,
just, and moral ways to solve their problems” (Hammond,
1973, p. 189). As Hammond and Grassia (1985, p. 233) put
it “People dispute many things besides diﬀerential gain, or
who gets what. They also disagree about (a) the facts (what
is, what was), (b) the future (what will be), (c) values (what
ought to be), and (d) action (what to do).”
As the triple-system lens model in Figure 3 illustrates,
there are four primary potential sources of cognitive con-
ﬂict. Judges may disagree about the relative importance
(i.e., relative weights) of the proximal cues; they may dis-
agree about the relationship between values of the cues and
values of the criterion (i.e., the appropriate function forms
for cues); they may disagree about the appropriate rule for
combining information from cues into a judgment (i.e., the
organizing principle); and they may disagree because one or
both judges are unable to make judgments in a consistent
way (i.e., imperfect cognitive control).
In a standard interpersonal conﬂict experiment (Brehmer,
1976; Cooksey, 1996; Hammond, 1965; 1973), participants
may be selected either because they already have conﬂicting
judgment policies or they may be taught to develop con-
ﬂicting policies. Unaware that they have diﬀerent policies,
participants are brought together and asked to co-operate on
solving a set of problems where cues are probabilistically
related to the criterion. On each trial, they consider the
available information and make judgments about the crite-
rion variable individually and then communicate these to
one another. If they disagree they must discuss the problem
until they reach an acceptable joint response. They are then
asked to reconsider their original decisions, and these revi-
sions remain private. Finally, they are presented with the
correct solution. Conﬂict or agreement is therefore deﬁned
objectively as the actual diﬀerences in the judgments made
by the two individuals.
Conﬂict may be due to systematic and non-systematic
cognitive diﬀerences in the way people perform the task.
Systematic diﬀerences refer to features of judgment poli-
cies such as the relative cue weights and non-systematic
diﬀerences refer to the idea that people may exercise im-
perfect cognitive control in the application of their policies
(Mumpower & Stewart, 1996). Research has shown that,
over a series of trials, participants unlearned their conﬂict-
ing policies and developed similar ones, however, conﬂict
persisted because individuals simultaneously became more
inconsistent in applying their revised policies. Such non-
systematic diﬀerences accounted for more conﬂict than did
systematic diﬀerences in judgment policies (Brehmer, 1976).
The aforementioned ﬁndings have been replicated using dif-
ferent types of participants and task conditions (Hammond
& Brehmer, 1973).
Brehmer’s (1976) research demonstrated how the degree
and nature of conﬂict (i.e., whether it is due to systematic
or non-systematic diﬀerences) is aﬀected by task conditions.
For example, he showed that policy consistency is lower in
less predictable tasks leading to less agreement; that non-
linear cues lead to lower consistency but do not aﬀect policy
similarity; that when the task contains linear cues and people
only have to use one cue they are more consistent but their
policy similarity is unaﬀected; that when the task contains
both linear and non-linear cues and people only have to use
one cue their policy similarity and consistency is higher; and
that inter-cue correlations lead to less policy similarity.
Hammond and Brehmer (1973) applied the technique of
cognitive feedback and developed a cognitive aid to con-
ﬂict resolution called POLICY (originally called COGNO-
GRAPH). This was an interactive computer program that en-
abled people to express their policies, compare them, change
them, and discover the eﬀects of such changes on cognitive
conﬂict. The emphasis is on teaching consistent new poli-
cies. It has been found that cognitive feedback helps to speed
conﬂict reduction (Balke et al., 1973).
In sum, research in the IPC paradigm has demonstrated
that agreement could be studied in the same way as achieve-
ment. Although the study of two cognitive systems has
become popular, and despite the potential for theoretical and
methodological advance of the concept of cognitive conﬂict,
Dhami and Olsson’s (2008) review reveals that research on
cognitive conﬂict using the lens model has declined sharply.
It has been replaced by research on what is called ‘task
conﬂict’ conducted by scholars interested in group conﬂict.
Unfortunately, the latter has less theoretical precision and
methodological rigor than Hammond’s IPC paradigm.
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7 Social Judgment Theory
In 1975, after two decades of work building on Brunswik’s
ideas and advancing them in the study of clinical judgment,
multiple-cue probability learning, interpersonal learning and
interpersonal conﬂict, Hammond and his colleagues (Ham-
mond et al., 1975) synthesized the key elements of this work
into a uniﬁed framework, which they called social judgment
theory (SJT). SJT is not a theory providing testable hypothe-
ses about the nature of human judgment, but a meta-theory
that provides a framework to guide research in this endeavor.
The basic concepts of SJT are all foreshadowed by the
two decades of work that preceded it, and so we shall not
discuss them in detail here. Suﬃce it to say that in SJT equal
status is accorded to both the human and environment, there
are parallel concepts depicting each side of the lens, and
the distinction between surface (proximal cues) and depth
(the environmental criterion and judgment about the envi-
ronmental criterion) is essential.
Social judgment theorists, as they have come to be known,
study “life relevant” issues (Hammond et al., 1975, p. 276),
and so much of SJT research is applied. There are four basic
goals of SJT research: (a) to analyze judgment tasks and
processes; (b) to analyze the structure of achievement and
agreement; (c) to understand how humans learn to achieve
and agree; and (d) to ﬁnd methods for improving achieve-
ment and agreement (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond
et al., 1975). SJT research, thus, aims to describe behavior
before prescribing changes to improve it. The model of the
environment serves as a benchmark, indicating how judg-
ment can be improved (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond
et al., 1964). Cognitive performance may be enhanced by
cognitive feedback and cognitive (decision) aids (Hammond
et al., 1975).
Several types of judgment situations are distinguished in
SJT research. These are the double-systems design, single-
system design, triple-systems design, the N-systems design
and the hierarchical design (see also Hammond, 1972; Ham-
mond et al., 1975). The ﬁrst refers to Brunswik’s (1952)
original lens model as shown in Figure 1, and involves
an analysis of the interaction between an individual and a
task. As mentioned earlier, this framework is used to study
achievement and multiple-cue probability learning.
The other judgment situations represent modiﬁcations to
the original lens model. As mentioned earlier, the single-
system design refers simply to an individual’s judgment pol-
icy, with no reference to achievement in the task (see Figure
2). The triple-systems design involves one task and two in-
dividuals (see Figure 3). It is used to study interpersonal
learning and interpersonal conﬂict. The N-systems design
involves more than one individual and may or may not in-
clude an analysis of the task. Research on policy formation
is conducted within this framework (e.g., Adelman, Stew-
art, & Hammond, 1975; Stewart & Gelberd, 1976). Finally,
there are judgment situations in which the cues themselves
may be judgments made at earlier stages of the judgment
process either by the same or diﬀerent judges. Hammond
et al. (1975, p. 286) refer to such situations as “hierarchi-
cal judgment models”. Here, an outcome criterion is often
unavailable and each stage is analyzed separately.13
In SJT research, judgment data is elicited over a series of
trials and is analyzed at the level of the individual (Hammond
et al., 1975). Hammond et al. (1975, p. 278) state that “the
judgment data are analyzed in terms of multiple regression
statistics.” Thus, correlational statistics and models such as
multiple linear regression are used to describe and explain
cognitive performance. However, as Brehmer (1979, p. 199)
pointed out:
A common misunderstanding is that SJT holds
that the judgment process itself operates accord-
ing to the principles of multiple regression. . . .just
because they use these methods for investigating
the judgment process. . . .Instead, the methods are
used to test a series of hypotheses about the nature
of the judgment process, hypotheses about the na-
ture of cue weights, function forms, combination
rules, and predictability.
SJT is also committed to representative design deﬁned in
terms of formal situational sampling (Brehmer, 1979; Cook-
sey, 1996; Hammond et al., 1975; Hammond & Wascoe,
1980). Here, all of the relevant cues, cue values, cue dis-
tributions, inter-cue correlations and ecological validities of
cues should be representative of those that exist in the nat-
ural version of the task. Hammond et al. (1975) recognized
that under representative conditions, the presence of inter-
cue correlations maymake it diﬃcult to ascertain the relative
independent eﬀects of each cue upon judgments. As an al-
ternative to representative design, they recommended multi-
method analyses where techniques such as predicting each
cue from the others and successive omission of cues may
be used.14 However, Dhami et al. (2004) have revealed that
researchers typically only study single-system cases and do
not use any form of representative design. Consequently, lit-
tle is known about judgmental achievement for many tasks,
and the lack of representative stimulus sampling threatens
the validity of the ﬁndings reported.
Hammond et al. (1975, p. 304) stated that “the unique
contribution of SJT has been to bring the theory, quantita-
tive procedures, results of research, and technological inno-
vations (externalization of judgment policies by means of
13Stewart (1976) developed a hierarchical formulation of the lens model
equation which made it possible to isolate the contributions of diﬀerent sets
of variables.
14Holaday (1933) had ﬁrst shown how an exemplary stimulus could be
systematically stripped of its complexity through ‘successive omission’ of
cues, andBrunswik (1956) viewed this as a hybrid design—mixing elements
of systematic and representative design.
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interactive computer graphics) to bear on social policy for-
mation outside the laboratory.” Over the past four decades
since its launch, SJT has inspired hundreds of applied and
basic studies of human judgment (for collections of such
studies see Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Dhami et al., 2004;
Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008), as well as some more recent ap-
proaches to the psychology of human judgment and decision
making (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Juslin et al., 2000).
One applied area of special note has been medical decision
making (e.g., González-Vallejo, Sorum, Stewart, Chessare&
Mumpower, 1998; Poses, Cebul, Wigton, et al., 1992; Tape,
Kripal &Wigton, 1992; Way, Allen, Mumpower et al., 1998;
Wigton, 1988; 1996). As Wigton (1996) observed, SJT is
particularly well suited to the study of medical judgments
because they characteristically involve decision making un-
der uncertainty with inevitable error and an abundance of
fallible cues. SJT has been useful in establishing variation
among decision makers’ judgments and in their weighting of
clinical information.
8 Cognitive Continuum Theory
Later in his career, still faithful to Brunswik’s ideas but go-
ing beyond them, Hammond developed cognitive continuum
theory (CCT, Hammond, 1996a, 2000a, 2001a; Hammond et
al., 1987). The key propositions of CCT include the premises
that cognition moves on an intuitive-analytical continuum;
that quasi-rationality represents a commonly used and impor-
tant middle-ground on this continuum; that cognitive tasks
induce diﬀerent modes of cognition; and that the upper level
of cognitive performance is dictated by the match between
properties of the task and mode of cognition.
More speciﬁcally, CCT states that there are modes of cog-
nition that lie in-between intuition and analysis (see also
Dhami, Belton & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015; Dhami &
Thomson, 2012). Intuition (often also referred to as Sys-
tem 1, experiential, heuristic, and associative thinking) is
generally considered to be an unconscious, implicit, auto-
matic, holistic, fast process, with great capacity, requiring
little cognitive eﬀort. By contrast, analysis (often also re-
ferred to as System 2, rational, and rule-based thinking) is
generally characterized as a conscious, explicit, controlled,
deliberative, slow process that has limited capacity and is
cognitively demanding. The modes of cognition that lie
in-between are quasirational.
As Hammond (2010, p. 331) points out, the term ‘quasi’
does not mean that quasirational modes of cognition are the
result of “improper cognitive activity”. In addition, Ham-
mond (1996, pp. 166–167, brackets added) takes pains to
diﬀerentiate quasirationaity from Herbert Simon’s (1957)
concept of bounded rationality, which he states “means that
cognitive activity has neither the time nor resources to ex-
plore [. . . ] completely the “problem space” of the task. The
problem space that is explored, however, is explored in a ra-
tional or analytical fashion.” For Hammond, quasirationality
is distinct from rationality. It comprises diﬀerent combina-
tions of intuition and analysis, and so may sometimes lie
closer to the intuitive end of the cognitive continuum and at
other times closer to the analytic end.
Brunswik (1943, 1952) pointed to the adaptive nature
of perception (and cognition).15 For Hammond (1996a,
2000b), modes of cognition are determined by properties
of the task (and/or expertise with the task). Task properties
include, for example, the amount of information, its degree
of redundancy, format, and order of presentation, as well as
the decision maker’s familiarity with the task, opportunity
for feedback, and extent of time pressure. The cognitive
mode induced will depend on the number, nature and de-
gree of task properties present. A task comprising either
intermediate levels of, or a combination of, those properties
inducing pure intuition or pure analysis will induce quasira-
tionality. Depending on task properties, quasirationalitymay
imply a combination where there is greater use of intuition
than analysis, or vice versa. Movement along the cognitive
continuum is characterized as oscillatory or alternating, thus
allowing diﬀerent forms of compromise between intuition
and analysis (i.e., diﬀerent forms of quasirationality).
According to Hammond, cognitive tasks can be diﬀer-
entiated from one another with regard to their properties
as well as the mode of cognition they induce (see also
Dhami & Thomson, 2012). Studies support the idea that
diﬀerent task properties induce diﬀerent modes of cogni-
tion (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino & Chu-Chun,
2000; Hamm, 1988; Hammond et al., 1987; see also Mahan,
1994). Success on a task inhibits movement along the cogni-
tive continuum (or change in cognitive mode) while failure
stimulates it. Hamm (1988) additionally demonstrated that
cognitive mode can shift during a task.
Brunswik (1943, 1952, 1956) stressed the signiﬁcance
of the correspondence or ﬁt between properties of the task
and the mode of cognition. Hammond (1988) predicted that
judgment performance is contingent on the degree of corre-
spondence between task properties and mode of cognition.
The key implication is that pure analysis may be neither nec-
essary nor suﬃcient for ceiling-level performance. Evidence
suggests that task characteristics are important in determin-
ing the upper bound of performance (e.g., Seifert & Hadida,
2013; Rusou, Zakay & Usher, 2013) and that achievement is
greater when the cognitive modematches that induced by the
task (e.g., Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al., 1987).
Although there is a growing body of evidence on the nature
and performance of intuitive versus analytic cognition (e.g.,
Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al., 1987;Mahan, 1994;
Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011), there is a distinct dearth of
15Hammond (1996) points out that Simon (1991) similarly viewed hu-
mans as ‘adaptive systems’ whose eﬀorts to understand their environments
are constrained, and consequently limit any potential for optimization.
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research on the operation and outcomes of quasirationality,
even though, as some have argued, this is the most common
mode of cognition inmany consequential tasks (Dhami et al.,
2015; Dhami & Thomson, 2012). In their eﬀorts to identify
the processes involved in intuitive versus analytic cognition,
Glöckner and his colleagues have found some similarities
and diﬀerences between these two modes of cognition (e.g.,
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; 2008b; 2012; Jekel, Glöckner,
Fiedler&Bröder, 2012; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm,&Glöckner,
2009). Their ﬁndings suggest that intuition and analysis may
operate in an integrative fashion and thus potentially shed
light on diﬀerent forms of quasirationality. For instance,
quasirationality may allow individuals to use a lot of infor-
mation quickly. Other work measuring the performance of
diﬀerent modes of cognition, for example by Blattberg and
Hoch (1990), has demonstrated that a quasirational model
which combined managerial intuition (expertise) and statis-
tical analysis repeatedly outperformed purely intuitive and
statistical models in ﬁve forecasting tasks (see also Ganzach,
Kluger & Klayman, 2000).
Hammond (2007) returned to the themes of analysis and
intuition and the cognitive continuum in his last book entitled
Beyond Rationality: The Search for Wisdom in a Troubled
Time, published at age 92. At the heart of his argument is the
proposition that the key to wisdom lies in being able to match
modes of cognition to properties of the task. In brief, for
most judgment and decision making tasks, quasirationality
is what is required for wisdom. According to Hammond
(2007, p. 237), “. . . the tactics that most of us use most of
the time are neither fully intuitive nor fully analytical: they
are a compromise that contains some of each; how much of
each depends on the nature of the task and on the knowledge
the person making the judgment brings to the task.”
9 Solving Applied Problems
Finally, it is notable that Hammond was as comfortable con-
ducting basic research in the laboratory as he was in solving
applied problems, especially in the policy context. In fact, an
emphasis on application to social policy formation was part
of the original declaration of SJT (Hammond et al., 1975). A
number of SJT inspired policy applications were undertaken
on topics ranging from citizen participation in community
planning, through water resource planning, to air pollution
management, and so forth (e.g., Brady & Rappoport, 1973;
Flack & Summers, 1971; Hammond, Mumpower & Smith,
1977; Mosier, Skitka, Heers & Burdick, 1998; Mumpower,
Veirs & Hammond, 1979; Stewart & Gelberd, 1972). Per-
haps the best known andmost inﬂuential of these applications
is Hammond and Adelman’s (1976) ‘Denver Bullet Study.’
The policy issue in the Denver Bullet Study concerned the
type of bullet that should be used by the Denver (Colorado,
USA) City Police. In 1974, the Denver Police Department
(DPD) decided to change its handgun ammunition because it
was argued that conventional round-nosed bullets provided
insuﬃcient ‘stopping eﬀectiveness’ (i.e., the ability to inca-
pacitate and thus to prevent the person shot from ﬁring back
at the police or others). The DPD chief recommended using
a hollow-point bullet, claiming that such bullets ﬂattened
on impact, thus decreasing penetration, increasing stopping
eﬀectiveness, and decreasing ricochet potential. This claim
was challenged by, for example, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union and minority groups. Opponents stated that
the new bullets were in fact outlawed ‘dum-dum’ bullets
which were more injurious than the round-nosed bullet and
so should be barred from use. There were public hearings,
debates and disputes, and appeals by both sides to ballistics
experts for scientiﬁc information and support. Disputants
focused on evaluating the merits of speciﬁc alternative bul-
lets—confounding the physical eﬀect of the bullets with so-
cial policy implications. As Hammond and Adelman (1976)
realized, they confounded questions of value — what the
bullet should accomplish with questions of fact — concern-
ing ballistic characteristics of speciﬁc bullets. Arguments
favored one option or another, but obscured the basis for a
preference.
Hammond and Adelman (1976) stated that policy makers
inadvertently had adopted the role of (unqualiﬁed) ballistics
experts, and ballistics experts inadvertently had adopted the
role of (poor) policy makers. Hammond and Adelman in-
tervened to ﬁrst discover the important policy dimensions
from the policy makers’ viewpoint and then elicited ballis-
tics experts’ ratings of the bullets on these dimensions. The
relevant dimensions were stopping eﬀectiveness, probabil-
ity of serious injury, and probability of harm to bystanders.
The experts’ ratings of the bullets on the last two dimensions
were almost perfectly confounded. The probability of seri-
ous harm to bystanders is highly related to the penetration
of the bullet, whereas the probability of the bullet eﬀectively
stopping someone from returning ﬁre is highly related to the
width of the entry wound. Giving equal weights to these
dimensions, and combining these weights with the experts’
technical judgments, led Hammond and Adelman (1976, p.
395) to identify a bullet that “has greater stopping eﬀective-
ness and is less apt to cause injury (and is less apt to threaten
bystanders) than the standard bullet then in use by the DPD.”
The bullet they recommended was accepted by both the DPD
and the Denver City Council and put into operation.
According to Adelman (1988, p. 443), the above study
illustrates the signiﬁcant contribution of SJT in identifying
the importance of the “separation of facts and values” in re-
solving social policy disputes. Adelman identiﬁes ﬁve key
points to be derived from the Denver Bullet Study and sim-
ilar applications. First, social polices comprise three types
of judgments: (a) value judgments about what ought to be,
(b) factual judgments about what is or will be, and (c) eval-
uative judgments that integrate value and factual judgments
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into a ﬁnal policy decision. Second, policy makers should
be responsible for value judgments and technical experts for
factual judgments. Third, methods exist to build quantitative
models for both value and factual judgments. Fourth, analyt-
ical methods can and should be used to combine value and
factual judgments so that alternatives can be systematically
evaluated. Fifth, cognitive feedback can be used to make
the implications of value judgments and factual judgments
explicit.
In 1996, Hammond published a book entitled Human
Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, In-
evitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice which attempted to
understand the policy formation process.16 He included
Brunswikian and SJT research as well as other work, notably,
Ward Edwards’ (1954, 1961) contributions using Bayesian-
themed behavioral decision theory. This 1996 book em-
phasized two key themes that Hammond had been consid-
ering for a number of years, but which he was able to more
fully address here. The ﬁrst theme was the distinction be-
tween theories of truth that emphasized coherence compe-
tence and theories of truth that emphasized correspondence
competence. The former is exempliﬁed in Ward Edward’s
Bayesian approach (and later in Kahneman and Tversky’s
‘heuristics and biases’ approach, e.g., Kahneman, Slovic &
Tversky, 1982) which accentuate normative rationality de-
ﬁned in terms of internal and logical consistency. The latter
is exempliﬁed by the Brunswikian and SJT approaches in
which empirical accuracy deﬁnes achievement. The issue,
according to Hammond, was whether in a policy context, it
was more important to be rational (internally and logically
consistent) or to be empirically accurate. Hammond’s treat-
ment of the strengths and limitations of the two approaches
is too nuanced and sophisticated to review fully here, but
his conclusions are guardedly optimistic that in the realm of
policy we can strike a balance between coherence and cor-
respondence. The key to achieving this balance lies in how
we think about error, which was the second theme.
Hammond (1996a) emphasized the duality of error. He
noted that, although this concept had been recognized long
before, it was not until Neyman and Pearson (1933) that dual-
ity of error (Type I and Type II error) was formally introduced
with a mathematical treatment. The concern with error was
also an important part of the Brunswikian legacy. Brunswik
(1956) demonstrated that the error distributions for intuitive
and analytical processes were quite diﬀerent. Intuitive pro-
cesses led to distributions in which there were few precisely
correct responses but also few large errors, whereas with
analysis there were often many precisely correct responses
but occasional large errors. According to Hammond, duality
of error inevitably occurs whenever decisions must be made
in the face of irreducible uncertainty, or uncertainty that can-
not be reduced at the moment action is required. Thus, there
16This book won the 1997 Outstanding Research Publication Award from
the American Educational Research Association.
are two potential mistakes that may arise — false positives
(Type I errors) and false negatives (Type II errors) — when-
ever policy decisions involve dichotomous choices, such as
whether to admit or reject college applications, claims for
welfare beneﬁts, and so on. Hammond (1996a) argued that
any policy problem involving irreducible uncertainty has the
potential for dual error, and consequently unavoidable injus-
tice in which mistakes are made that favor one group over
another.
In this work, Hammond made a remarkable and inﬂu-
ential advance to the Brunswikian and SJT approaches,
pushing those ideas all the way from perception through
thinking to policy formation. He identiﬁed two tools of
particular value for analyzing policy making in the face of
irreducible environmental uncertainty and duality of error.
These were Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Tanner & Swets,
1954; Swets, 1992) and the Taylor-Russell (1939) paradigm.
Others have extended these ideas in a number of substan-
tive policy areas such as college admissions (Mumpower,
Nath & Stewart, 2002), child welfare services (Mumpower,
2010; Mumpower&McClelland, 2014), international policy
(Dunwoody &Hammond, 2006), and mammography (Stew-
art & Mumpower, 2004). In fact, Hammond’s 1996 book,
published almost 50 years after his ﬁrst academic paper, is
now his most cited work.
10 Closing Remarks
In closing, it is worth noting that Hammond made several at-
tempts, albeit with mixed success, to integrate Brunswikian
and SJT perspectives with other normative, prescriptive, and
descriptive theories of human judgment and decision mak-
ing. One of the ﬁrst eﬀorts in this regard was the book
published in 1980 entitled Human Judgment and Decision
Making: Theories, Methods, and Procedures (Hammond,
McClelland & Mumpower, 1980). This grew out of the
Twelfth Annual Conference on Human Judgment, held in
April 1978, in Boulder, Colorado. The conference Ham-
mond organized brought together 25 prominent scholars who
represented approaches to the study of judgment and decision
making that focusedmore on analytic thought to those that fo-
cused more on intuition.17 Six approaches were included as
follows: Decision Theory, Behavioral Decision Theory, Psy-
chological Decision Theory, Social Judgment Theory, Infor-
mation Integration Theory, and Attribution Theory. These
were compared and contrasted in terms of six categories:
origins, scope, intended function, principal concepts, loci
17For a photograph of attendees at the conference, who included pioneers
of judgment and decision making research such as Norman Anderson, Hut-
ton Baron, Robyn Dawes, Michael Doherty, Ward Edwards, Hillel Einhorn,
Baruch Fischhoﬀ, Kenneth Hammond, Marty Kaplan, Ralph Keeney, Sarah
Lichtenstein, Ned Jones, Mel Manis, Gary McClelland, Lee Ross, James
Shanteau, Kelly Shaver, Paul Slovic, Thomas Stewart, Amos Tversky, and
others, see http://www.brunswik.org/photos/bldrgroup.html.
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of concepts, and intended uses. The book remains widely
cited, although it is unclear how much direct inﬂuence it
had on the ﬁeld of judgment and decision making, and some
reviewers were unconvinced that integration was possible
(e.g., Phillips, 1982).
Hammond was not deterred from continuing his eﬀorts to
explicate his own work and the work of others in the ﬁeld of
judgment and decision making. In 1981, he was part of a
team that produced a glossary intended to help decipher the
idiosyncratic terminology used by diﬀerent approaches and
disambiguate usage of the same or similar terms to mean dif-
ferent things (Anderson, Deane, Hammond et al., 1981). The
team deﬁned each major concept in judgment and decision
making, and provided its source, usage, current status and
relationship with other concepts. Indeed, students entering
the ﬁeld and scholars outside the ﬁeld still ﬁnd this glossary
useful, although it now needs to be updated to encompass
the continued evolution and addition of approaches over the
decades since the book was published.
In this paper, we have discussed the major and distinctive
contributions that Hammond made to the science of human
judgment and decision making throughout his illustrious ca-
reer. In sum, his ground-breaking research extended Egon
Brunswik’s theory of probabilistic functionalism and lens
model framework to the study of human judgment and de-
cision making. Through SJT, Hammond proposed a general
framework for the study of judgment processes. This en-
abled analysis of individual judgment as well as judgment in
situations where individuals interact with one another. This
framework also allowed researchers to describe and explain
judgmental achievement as well as explore ways to improve
it. Going beyond Brunswik’s ideas, Hammond introduced
CCT which is the ﬁrst comprehensive theory in psychol-
ogy of the relation between task properties and cognition.
Hammond’s commitment to scholarship was matched by his
desire to improve our social world; evidenced by his eﬀorts
to apply research to the improvement of public policy deci-
sions.
The importance of Hammond’s contribution to the psy-
chology of judgment and decision making continues to be
manifest in the work of his students and colleagues in such
disparate ﬁelds as educational research, clinical decision
making, healthcare and medical decision making, social
work, social perception, group decision making and negoti-
ation, accounting and auditing, law, public policy analysis,
human factors, and human technology interaction. Like
Hammond, many of these researchers have engaged in both
basic and applied research. We have to thank Hammond for
creating a path onwhichwe could travel during our academic
careers. We hope the present paper will inspire new scholars
to take their own intellectual journeys building upon, and
advancing, Hammond’s legacy.
Brief Biography of Kenneth R. Ham-
mond
Kenneth R. Hammond was born in San Francisco, Califor-
nia in 1917. He died in Boulder, Colorado, in 2015. He
received his BA, MA, and PhD from the University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley. In 1948, he accepted an appointment in
the Department of Psychology at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, where he taught until his retirement in 1987. There,
he co-founded both the Institute of Behavioral Science and
the Center for Research on Judgment and Policy. He was
a visiting professor at the Universities of Hawaii, Berkeley,
and Arizona, as well as a visiting scholar at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and the Rockefeller
Foundation Bellagio Center. His research was supported
by the National Science Foundation, the U. S. Public Health
Service, the Army Research Institute, the Oﬃce of Naval Re-
search, the Commonwealth Fund, and other private founda-
tions. In 1982, he was awarded an honorary doctorate from
the University of Uppsala, Sweden. In 1983, he founded
the Brunswik Society which continues to serve as a forum
for the discussion of Brunswikian ideas among researchers
from around the world. In 1987–88, Hammond served as the
second President of the Society for Judgment and Decision
Making, a Society that some recall he helped to establish.
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